Friends, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe and send abortion decisions back to the states (for now, at least), and the requisite fallout so far, I have a few stray reflections to share. I also have a few additional comments about the framework for legislation I shared earlier this week.
First, as a reminder, here’s the essay I wrote after the oral arguments in the case. Also, here’s the statement I provided at POLITICO’s request after the decision.
1. I’m grateful for the feedback and response to my proposed framework in the wake of Dobbs. The framework is not my ideal, that’s not the point of it. It’s a proposal for a legislative settlement that recognizes the current state of play, and is responsive to the interests of Republicans and Democrats.
I have been struck by the certainty of some Twitter commenters who assume the capacity of their own side to compromise, but absolutely reject even a sliver of possibility that the other side might compromise on the issue. I won’t renarrate the history of national abortion politics since 2014 or so once again, but the upshot here is that compromise, in policy or rhetoric, has been virtually absent from both sides of the aisle on this issue.
Of course, are those who suggest a compromise itself is a betrayal. If the only alternatives were the status quo, or their ideal policy outcome, I would give this approach greater merit, particularly on this issue. However, what is so often evaded in all of these accusations is that those making the charge never want to hold themselves to account for the outcomes of their strategies. The absolutists want to claim purity, but they so often refuse to take responsibility for the fact that while they’re insisting on their ideal, things can (and often do!) get worse. The idea of the framework is that the new threat of a truly zero-sum outcome for both sides of the abortion debate could contribute to a new incentive structure in which both sides are willing to compromise on longstanding aims in order to limit the chances that they would, in their eyes, “lose everything.” It’s worth testing that.
The case for the framework is straightforward, though I’m clear-eyed about the likelihood it would receive the support it would need to become law. To reject the framework, one should at the very least have some idea of a plan that a) is at least as viable politically b) secures more for their own interests than mine does, on a comparable time horizon. I have not seen those proposals. I welcome them.
One thing we must come to terms with is that whatever happens next, like what came before it, will be a political decision. In politics, you do not achieve what you want by simply willing it to be so, or willing your preferred outcome more fervently than others. Actual reality, the actual state of play, has to be contended with, especially by those making demands and issuing statements.
I’ll close out this section here: this situation can get very bad, worse than it is today. I’ll admit my disposition is to seek to limit the potential for the worst possible outcomes to come to pass. The framework is the most viable path I can think of to avoid the worst-case scenarios that I think are very real, potential trajectories from where we stand today. Perhaps if we just let this play out at the state level, or work to elect enough people who agree with us completely, perhaps that will work and we’ll achieve everything we dreamed of. To compromise is to, in some way, foreclose the possibility of achieving what you want without compromise. Perhaps, if I had the benefit of knowing what the future would hold, I would hold this moment much more lightly, much more cavalierly.
But—acknowledging my limited knowledge of the future, keeping in mind what I’ve learned and experienced as I’ve worked on these issues for the last fifteen years, and knowing what I know from close relationships and histories with some of the leading pro-choice and pro-life advocates in the country—I can’t help but feel that this will not just work itself out. If something like the framework I proposed is not pursued and enacted, my fervent hope will be that it is for the good, and that it leads to an even better outcome than what I could have even imagined as a possibility.
But I’m not willing to bet on it.
2. This Twitter thread got more attention than I expected.
3. Here’s one proposal:
4. Axios reported late last month that Speaker Pelosi is planning votes not only on abortion rights, but same-sex marriage and contraception. It’s a genius political move, especially if she keeps the language of the bills tight, and doesn’t try to use the moment to achieve more than the codification of the current status quo and avoids major religious freedom conflicts. Votes on contraception and same-sex marriage are easy votes for almost all Democrats, and very difficult for many Republicans. Either way (again, so long as they’re relatively clean bills) these are low-cost votes for Democrats, and deflating votes for Republicans. In fact, if done right, I think this strategy is one of the few glimmers of hope Democrats have for retaining the House/Senate.
By the way, it strikes me that this approach helps our Catholic Speaker of the House, and potentially our Catholic President, from feeling like they’re leading a national charge on abortion rights per se. These are politicians who largely envisioned building their political legacies in other areas where they are aligned with Catholic doctrine: health care, anti-poverty measures, the environment. How must they feel to be thrust into the serving as the primary defenders of abortion rights at the very same time they see the end of the political careers on the horizon (especially in the case of Speaker Pelosi, who previously indicated this might be her last term as Speaker)? Granted, both are at odds with Catholic hierarchy on contraception and same-sex marriage as well, but those issues never stoked as much conflict (internal or otherwise) as abortion.
5. Finally, related to the last point, for pro-choice advocates, this is not the optimal election to serve as a referendum on this issue. For the last six months, at least, Democrats have been projected to lose dozens of seats in the House, and have a very difficult time holding onto the Senate. I’m not proposing here that the issue should somehow be left off the agenda, I don’t think that’s really possible, but I am pointing out a basic political reality: What happens if Democrats say, “these midterms are about protecting abortion rights,” and they lose? What message might the public receive if Republicans still win majorities this Fall while Democrats’ staked their case on the imperative of protecting/securing abortion rights?
Too many people think bipartisanship is getting the other party to help implement your preferred policy. Kinda frustrating we didn't get a victory lap for the bipartisan gun legislation to illustrate the situation.
Your framework is great, I think Josh Marshall has offered a more politically viable path to getting to a place where it could be enacted, see his NYT op-ed "Democrats Can Win This Fall if They Make One Key Promise".
Democrats are more liable to accept compromise not because they are virtuous, but because they are losing. Dobbs has put them back on their heels, your framework can be understood as a tactical retreat. Republicans are halfway to the promise they have made since 1984, a national ban on abortion. It is a glorious victory, payment is due after decades of toil. Why compromise when you are winning?
Also, most abortions are early term. Strong pro-choice Democrats can console themselves under your framework, numerically we win. I see no similar comfort for strong pro-life Republicans. It would be a shattering loss, defeat snatched from the hands of victory. An unconscionable betrayal. Only Collins and Murkowski could vote for it.
The needed compromise is within the Democratic Party. Marshall puts forward the best path to getting to an up or down vote, and he has made progress extracting promises from key Senators since. Once there only a bill like yours would be so popular I can imagine it surviving a Republican trifecta. Could the Democrats resist spiking the ball and expanding abortion rights beyond Roe? I hope so.
In the meantime the filibuster is an unsurmountable obstacle to any bill. No, your framework cannot get 10 Republican votes. It can get two.
Marshall offers a route to getting past the filibuster. Once only 50 votes are needed your framework would have a chance, the argument to Democrats is durability. Only a moderate and bi-partisan bill will be popular, and only a popular bill will survive the next Republican trifecta.
Another arguments to get Democrats to compromise: 2024. Putting a chronic divisive issue to rest with a popular compromise would be huge.