Imagine this. It’s 2011. You’re the leader of a European country in the middle of a major debt crisis that is not yours. Your country is not in dire straits itself, but you’re tied to this debt crisis through a very complex monetary and trade and - most importantly - political policy. If one of the dominoes fall (i.e. fellow EU member states), you have truly no idea how bad it can get for you and everyone else. The debt crisis might even start a global financial crisis. So you’ve supported bailing out Greece with the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. You have a few levers you can pull with the other band of countries who are in this with you and who are also more stable. You must convince members of your own political party about the importance of any new bailout. You’re worried. This crisis is ongoing and testing the very fabric of a now-54 year old pact between you and 26 other countries. And where is the US? Ah, it is pivoting. Pivoting towards Asia, apparently. They are calling it “America’s Pacific Century.” America’s chief diplomat is writing op-eds like this:
And you’re a bit concerned. What will this mean for the transatlantic alliance? What does it mean for the security of my nation?
And now here we are today. Ukraine, a country on the eastern outskirts of whatever it is we deem Europe, has been invaded, twice, by Russia since 2010. The Obama administration did sort-of pivot towards East Asia, but in the end, when push came to shove, the G7/G8 still ruled the day and the post-WWII order (i.e. the institutions, values, and ideas that make up our system of global politics today) held firm. The EU ended up surviving that 2010-2018 debt crisis in Greece and other member states, much in part because the EU had a disproportionately strong economic leader, Germany, negotiating internally and globally to rescue the bloc. Europe had a migrant crisis a few years after that they also weathered, again, much in part due to the leadership of Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel. The first Trump administration executed rhetorical attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and skepticism towards European allies in his first administration. But, the core structures of the system survived.
The endurance of the post-WWII alliance between the US and Europe has been rigorously tested in the last 35 years (e.g. the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and the Bosnia and Kosovo wars, Northern Ireland peace, the ‘08 financial crisis). The pressures on the alliance have been palpable.
In the midst of so much political and economic upheaval in the last 70 days of the new American administration, it’s really hard to zoom in on the absolute strain this alliance is under. So much else feels more immediate, more threatening. But we should, we must, also attend to the structural damage that is being done, even if the consequences are less readily apparent.
The current foreign policy of the United States is not “going it alone” as many would postulate, but rather “do the opposite.” It is a profoundly reactionary foreign policy. It is a foreign policy of ego on the global stage. The egoist always thinks they are being strong, but they are guided by their grievances and insecurities. The spectacle of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is strikingly emotional. It is not so much America’s interest Trump defends—this is a misnomer—as much as it is his deeply emotional sense of America’s honor, of America getting her due.
The transatlantic alliance has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy, and the entire global order, for the last 80 years. And the United States came to that alliance the hard way, through a brutal world war. The transatlantic alliance is, itself, America’s playing out of its interests. We have had Europe as a friend, and furthermore, the Commonwealth as a friend, which is why the new schism with Canada feels so foreign, for a long time.
Because of the normalization of transatlantic relations, the way it has happened up until 2016 has felt conventional. Phone lines were open, policy collaboration opportunities were abundant, and we shared intelligence. Any scholar or casual observer could say that Europe and the US have survived a lot of crises together since 1989 in-line and in-step with one another. We also cannot forget that before 1989, we survived the Cold War together. It has not always been perfect; the self-interest of each state has sometimes rubbed the wrong way in the last 80 years (e.g. the 2003 Iraq war). But it has felt conventional and within some sort of bounds that felt rational vis-a-vis the way our global order is structured.
Shared values have been a vital factor in the transatlantic alliance. I will point you to what I think is the best illustration of the definition of the US-Europe values-system: the Atlantic Charter, developed between the US and UK in August 1941 and proceeding President Roosevelt’s important “Four Freedoms” speech to Congress in January 1941.
"The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future of the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
The US and our European/Commonwealth allies have codified this Atlantic Charter over and over again since 1941. These shared values have not always been reflected in how each member of the alliance approaches a policy or speech or exchange, but the underlying assumption has been that you can approach these values from different angles and in the end, you will get to common ground.
Another major driving factor of the transatlantic alliance, and the US’s self-interest, is soft power. Soft power is the acting out of our shared values. Soft power was coined by a political scientist named Joseph Nye in the late 1980s. The Council on Foreign Relations has a good short summary of what it means:
…defining it as a country’s ability to influence others without resorting to coercive pressure. In practice, that process entails countries projecting their values, ideals, and culture across borders to foster goodwill and strengthen partnerships.
Soft power usually originates outside government in places like schools, religious institutions, and charitable groups. It’s also formed through music, sports, media, and major industries like Silicon Valley and Hollywood.
But that doesn’t mean governments are absent from cultivating and wielding soft power.
Look at the United States and the Soviet Union, for example. During the Cold War, the two superpowers used that form of influence as a nonviolent method of promoting their cultural, economic, and political values. Respective displays of soft power undercut opposing ideologies in the process.
I worked for years for the most powerful expression of British soft power - the British Council. I saw, first-hand, how soft power is not just sitting in a box by itself, but it is made stronger or weaker because of its relationship with other countries’ soft power. When soft power overlaps with another in complementary ways, when it shares space comfortably — like how US and UK soft power does — it is amplified. It often looks like symbiosis, because the underlying values are very similar, even if the history is different or the mechanism and channel are different (Oscars vs. BAFTA, etc. etc. etc.). Soft power goes beyond propaganda and by its nature makes another country look good by doing good, and soft power strengthens diplomatic bonds.
In the last 70 days, we have undermined our soft power and the shared soft power of the transatlantic alliance. The Vice President delivered an acerbic speech at the Munich Security Forum. The Trump administration threatens high tariffs on our European/Commonwealth allies. The administration continues to undermine NATO. Russia acknowledges foreign policy alignment with the United States. Last week, we officially dismantled USAID, our foreign aid arm of the federal government. We are moving from soft power to hard power in ways that fly in the face of the US’s approach to the world for several decades. We are abandoning decades of goodwill built up by our values and culture.
The United States is abdicating our soft power, and allowing others who don’t align with our values to fill it. We are testing the thickness of the European alliance. If our alliance with Europe has been strong since that Atlantic Charter in 1941, one would expect that it can endure four years of antagonism and some structural change. But can 80 years survive radical change and total financial upheaval? The United States pursued an Asia Pivot and then elected Donald Trump with his anti-NATO aspirations in the 2010s. Following those changes, there were meetings, phone calls, memos, agreements, deals, and cables running between Europe and the Biden administration to repair the transatlantic alliance. Case in point: this write-up from the EU’s diplomatic arm called it a reset of transatlantic relations. And that reset was needed with just a bit of surface pressure. Today, we are experiencing a much more crushing, stratospheric pressure.
Unfortunately, time is the only factor here that we are forced to rely on, since we no longer have the federal government actively pursuing soft power and transatlantic relations. Perhaps the world of civil society (this includes the American Church) can step in. However, we are on the precipice of a global recession. With financial upheaval usually comes the tightening of purse strings, even philanthropic ones, and fewer resources available to fill the gaping hole left by government. Even in near-utopia, civil society probably could not match the government in a multitude of areas.
So many do not like the “post-WWII global order” or question those who would defend it because they dislike neoliberalism or they dislike globalization. But that same order sought to install peace after two devastating world wars, and it has succeeded in that mission. When the next territorial dispute erupts, or we face a global economic crisis, or the next country threatens the use of nuclear weapons — where will the United States find friends to address these problems?
By asserting America’s dominance, the burgeoning Trump foreign policy doctrine risks the loss of American leadership. President Trump values America’s power while despising America’s responsibility. Because he does not appreciate that with great power comes great responsibility, history may teach him (and the rest of us) that when great power turns its back on great responsibility, the power eventually goes with it.
While Trump views the transatlantic alliance as a burden, he ought to be careful what he wishes for. America’s strength, America’s economy, America’s security: it was all built on the foundation of an order and set of institutions that this administration seeks to disrupt. I mourn the prospect of losing that foundation. I shudder to think what else that sits upon that foundation will be lost as a result of this reckless experiment.
The system we are turning our back on cannot survive without us because we were its principal architect. Europe and the Commonwealth may well design something new, if we continue on our current path towards alliance destruction. If they do, I lament the growing potential of our status in that system: adversary. Will Europe keep for 4 years? I pray they do.
I found this piece really interesting, Melissa.
I recently watched a video on Game Theory and international relations (related to the Prisoner's Dilemma and cooperation). Obviously, the Trump administration is choosing to defect rather than cooperate in posture. It seems to me that the Trump administration defects to bring other nations to the table, which then leads to some sort of strange cooperation. Clearly there's been significant damage rendered nationally and internationally, but in your assessment, is there any sense in which other nations are too afraid to defect as well?
It is wonderful to hear from you on this topic, Melissa! Thank you for your insight.